INTRODUCTION
In perfectly competitive labour markets, the imposition of a binding minimum wage leads to reductions in aggregate employment and social welfare. On the other hand it is also well-known that monopsony can lead to increases in aggregate employment and welfare after a minimum wage imposition, a result which has fuelled much debate in the literature (see Manning (2003) ). Bhaskar and To (1999) extend the monopsony argument to a differentiated oligopsony; with exogenous, horizontal differentiation of non-wage job characteristics (symmetric locations along a Salop "circular city") welfare improvements from minimum wages emerge again via the aggregate employment channel. Our objective is to demonstrate the existence of a new channel whereby minimum wages can improve welfare in a differentiated oligopsony, namely the choice of non-wage job characteristics. To do this we switch to a Hotelling duopsony ("linear city") model in which firms choose locations (i.e. the non-wage job characteristic) at stage I and wages at stage II of a 2-stage game.
Following Bhaskar and To (2003) (where there is no welfare discussion) we also allow the two firms to differ in their inherent efficiency of employing labour (the marginal revenue products differ). Abstracting from all aggregate employment effects we show in detail how the imposition of minimum wages improves social welfare via its impact on the non-wage job characteristics. Indeed (up to a restriction regarding existence of pure strategy equilibria) the imposition of a minimum wage always improves on the laissez-faire outcome. Moreover the mechanism is totally dependant on the changes in non-wage job characteristics; if such changes are impossible (e.g. in a "short-run") minimum wages reduce welfare.
The paper therefore studies the laissez-faire market outcome in a Hotelling duopsony with asymmetric firm efficiency (section 3), and the social optimum in such a world (section 3 also). The results of section 3 offer no essential novelty beyond that provided by Ziss (1993) in his completely parallel results for the laissez-faire outcome and social optima in a Hotelling duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs.
We go on to study the effect of minimum wages on the market outcome (section 4) and on social welfare (sections 5) with the results claimed above. Section 2 introduces the framework of our analysis and section 6 concludes.
THE FRAMEWORK
There are 2 firms (i =0,1) producing output from labour at constant marginal revenue product of α for firm 0 and β for firm 1, where α > β. It maybe that the marginal physical product is higher at firm 0, or the difference may be caused by firm 0 selling in a more profitable output market than firm 1; for convenience we refer to firm 0 as the efficient firm. The wage offered by firm i is w i , i = 0,1 and is subject to minimum wage legislation whereby only w i ≥ w can be chosen; throughout we There is a continuum of workers whose ideal non-wage job characteristics are uniformly distributed over [0, 1] . Taking a job at firm i whose non-wage job characteristic is at a distance d from a worker's ideal provides the worker with job utility w i -td 2 where t > 0 is a parameter. Following d 'Aspremont et.al. (1979) we assume that each worker supplies inelastically one unit of labour to the firm that offers the higher job utility, so that the worker whose ideal non-wage characteristic is at x ∈ [0,1] works for firm 0 if so that firms cannot offer wages in excess of their marginal revenue product.
We do this to avoid some implausible stage II subgame equilibria when firms collocate (a = 1-b) again following the homogeneous product Bertrand lead (see Hurter and Lederer (1986) for a discussion).
Although the focus is on the case with α>β, we also extend results to the case α = β. 
TWO BENCHMARKS: LAISSEZ-FAIRE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND THE SOCIAL OPTIMUM
The two main results of this section pertain to the laissez-faire market equilibrium (the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the 2-stage game when , 0 = w Theorem 1) and the social optima (Theorem 2). Both results are due essentially to Ziss (1993) , where Proposition 2 equates to Theorem 1 and Proposition 4 is the analogue of Theorem 2. However we include full derivations of our results since the duopsony setting and notation is quite different from Ziss's (1993) duopoloy, and since we use our supporting lemmas to build the minimum wage analysis of sections 4 and 5. We denote 
The following lemmas 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 (proofs for 3.1 and 3.3 are found in the Appendix) provide a proof of Theorem 1. We first describe the best responses and Nash equilibrium (NE) in stage II subgames at arbitrary locations (a,b)
. Note that the subgame at (a,b) ∈ S has, from symmetry, the same outcome as that at (1-a, 1-b) ∈ [0,1] 2 , so description of subgame NE for (a,b) ∈ S ∪ H suffices. Note also that when δ ≤ 3, T is a nonempty convex subset of S, and has an upper boundary in S which is downward sloping with 
For a wage subgame with location (a,b) ∈ T, the unique Nash equilibrium wages, market shares and profits are;
(c) For a wage subgame with location (a,b) ∈ (S ∪ H)/T, the unique Nash equilibrium wages, market shares and profits are;
The efficient firm thus sets higher wages in subgames anywhere on S/T, and also in lemma 3.1. These payoffs are continuous functions. We look first at the "constrained best response" of the inefficient firm in this game, which solves: 
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3(a) and (b) complete the proof of Theorem 1. respectively, and dictates the subsets of workers who will work at the 2 firms. We continue to assume that all workers will be employed, the worker located at x ∈ [0,1] generating surplus ( )
Substituting the top branch here into the SW formula and writing 
Similar substitution of the bottom branch produces;
Hence the maximum social welfare attainable at locations (a,b) ∈ S∪H is; 
MINIMUM WAGES AND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
To find the effect on market equilibrium (SPE of the 2-stage game) we first identify the effect of the minimum wage on the stage II wage subgames at arbitrary stage I locations. We use the notation (A) the laissez-faire values described in lemma 3.1(b) iff
For wage subgames with locations (a,b)∈(S∪H)\T and minimum
∈ w the unique Nash equilibrium wages, market shares and profits are the laissez-fiare values described in Lemma 3.1(c).
Proof of Lemma 4.1
For (a, b) ∈ S, Lemma 3.1(a) and the quasi-concavity of i π as a function of w i noted in its proof ensure that the best responses of firm 0 are described by (i) - (iii) below, and those of firm 1 by (iv)-(vi):
of one of (i)-(iii) coupled with one of (iv)-(vi). (1) 
Substitution of w 0 shows (7) is equivalent to ). , ( (5) and (7) imply those of (6) and (8), so (ii)/(v) produce NE with w w w = ≥ 1 0 (and market shares and profits of (c)) iff (5) and (7) (1) 
(a subset of the type A equilibrium domains in figure 4 .1), and we restrict attention to (a,b) ∈ T in (i) -(iv). 
At an interior type B equilibrium (where either ) , ( 
, a
Note for future reference that a new critical minimum wage value will emerge when, in figure 4.1(c), Y 2 has a coordinate of . there is no pure strategy SPE.
Proof of Theorem 3 The proof involves a number of steps.
Step 1 
has the sign of ( )( ).
has the sign of ( ) ( ).
Step 2 The derivatives in Step 1 imply that, when , 2 * * 1 w w w ≤ ≤ the unique (up to symmetry) remaining SPE candidate is at the point P indicated in figure 4.2(a) and (b) on the border between regions A and C. Since b=0 here and since Step 1 ensures that firm 0 will not want to deviate to any a where ( )
is indeed SPE provided firm 0's profit at P is at least as large as at co-location (a=1, b=0). This will be true if 
and H is concave, ensuring the desired result and completing the proof of (a)(i).
Step 3 When , 2 w w w ≤ ≤ the unique (up to symmetry) remaining SPE candidate is at P in figure 4 .2(c).
Step 1 ensures that form 0 does not want to deviate from P to any location which leaves (a,b) ∈ T.
We show next that firm 0 does not want to deviate from P to collocate; this requires,
≥ 0, and clearly is satisfied. It remains to show that firm 0 does not want to deviate from P to any location strictly to the right of firm 1. For convenience let (a * , b * ) now denote P; notice that . (ii) in A where a = 0 and . 0 / , 1 * 0
π totally with respect to b and using the da/db expression shows that ( ) 
(1 -a -b) > 0. Again social welfare can be written as a function of a where The above shows that in the "long-run", via its impact on the non-wage job characteristic, the imposition of a minimum wage is welfare-improving over laissezfaire. Finally we consider the "short-run" impact in which we assume that the nonwage job characteristic remains fixed at its laissez-faire level of a = b = 0 or 1 (we continue to restrict attention to δ < ½). The short-run affect of a minimum wage is as follows, from Lemma 4.1; Adapting the previous general formula, social welfare in the short run (SSW) depends on the minimum wage as follows:
Where L 0 = L 0 ( w ) and; Thus in the short-run minimum wages typically (δ>0) reduce social welfare from the laissez faire level. What happens is that the minimum wage first binds only on the inefficient firm with the efficient firm responding by also increasing its wage from the laissez-faire level, but by less than the inefficient firm's (forced) increase. As a result the inefficient firm's market share increases, which causes the fall in welfare. Thus the positive long run welfare impact of minimum wages in Theorem 4 is driven by and dependent on the effect of minimum wages on the non-wage job characteristics.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown how the imposition of minimum wages can be welfare improving on laissez-faire, because of their impact on firms' choice of non-wage job characteristics.
In the context of a Hotelling duopsony, jobs are horizontally differentiated (e.g. by location) and the effect of the minimum wage is to narrow the gap between "locations" chosen by firms compared to the maximum differentiation chosen under laissez-faire (at least when the efficiency differential between firms is small enough), in a welfare improving way. The paper thus provides a new route through which minimum wages can be "a good thing", over and above the beneficial employment effects of the previous literature. It also generates a natural question for further research in the differentiated oligopsony framework, namely the effect of minimum wages on vertically differentiated job characteristics (e.g. quality of the work environment), as opposed to our horizontal differentiation.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 3.1 (a) From the definitions of ; and
It is easy to check that (1), (2) 
